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The visual sense has outstanding significance for human perception and behavior, and
visual attention plays a central role in the processing of the sensory input. Thereby,
multiple low- and high-level factors contribute to the guidance of attention. The present
review focuses on two neglected high-level factors: emotion and personality. The review
starts with an overview of different models of attention, providing a conceptual framework
and illustrating the nature of low- and high-level factors in visual attention. Then, the
ambiguous concept of emotion is described, and recommendations are made for the
experimental practice. In the following, we present several studies showing the influence
of emotion on overt attention, whereby the distinction between internally and externally
located emotional impacts are emphasized. We also provide evidence showing that
emotional stimuli influence perceptual processing outside of the focus of attention,
whereby results in this field are mixed. Then, we present some detached studies showing
the reversed causal effect: attention can also affect emotional responses. The final section
on emotion–attention interactions addresses the interplay on the neuronal level, which
has been neglected for a long time in neuroscience. In this context, several conceptual
recommendations for future research are made. Finally, based on findings showing
inter-individual differences in human sensitivity to emotional items, we introduce the
wide range of time-independent personality traits that also influence attention, and in this
context we try to raise awareness of the consideration of inter-individual differences in the
field of neuroscience.
Keywords: visual attention, high-level factors, emotion, personality, attention-emotion interactions,
inter-individual differences
INTRODUCTION
VISUAL ATTENTION: MODELS, DEFINITIONS, AND INFLUENTIAL
FACTORS
Our view of the world to a large degree rests on the information
we gather by the visual sense, and visual attention plays a cen-
tral role in the processing of the sensory input. By directing one’s
attention to specific features in the environment, these features
are processed in more depth than those environmental charac-
teristics that are not the focus of attention (Chun et al., 2011).
Several psychological and neuropsychological models of attention
have been developed so far (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Kahneman,
1973; Posner and Petersen, 1990; Mirsky, 1996; Coull, 1998;
Corbetta and Shulman, 2012), but nonetheless a precise defini-
tion of attention is lacking. Currently, it is generally accepted that
several sub-systems of attention can be differentiated.
Based on neuropsychological findings and single-cell record-
ings inmonkeys, Posner and Petersen (1990); Petersen and Posner
(2012) suggested three neuronal networks which are distinctive
but collaborate to direct attention to specific locations in space.
The posterior attentional (orienting) system prioritizes the sen-
sory input by selecting a modality and location. The anterior
attentional system is involved in detecting stimuli of current
relevance by capturing awareness in a specific way and slow-
ing detection of another potential target. This process is related
to the limited capacity of the attention system and awareness,
hence often labeled as focal attention. Finally, they postulated
an alerting system being involved in preparing and sustaining
alertness to process high-priority signals. This classical frame-
work has recently been updated on the basis of new findings that
deepen or expand the original networks (Petersen and Posner,
2012).
According to Coull (1998), one sub-system is responsible for
directing attention to a stimulus (attentional orientation). A sec-
ond sub-system mediates selective attention by giving focused
attention to a particular stimulus while diminishing the attention
to other stimuli (biased competition). A third sub-system pro-
vides divided attention between several stimuli even when they
are spatially separated (Hahn and Kramer, 1998), and hence indi-
cates that the current eye position does not necessarily correspond
to the focus of attention. A fourth sub-system is additionally
responsible for sustaining the attention to one or several (even
non-contiguous) zones of the visual field (Müller et al., 2003).
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Corbetta and Shulman (2012) found evidence for a dorsal
frontoparietal network, including intraparietal sulcus, frontal eye
field, and middle temporal complex, which was the primary
network involved in selective attention to stimuli in the envi-
ronment. Endogenous (i.e., voluntarily directed) shifts of atten-
tion activated the dorsal network, but it was co-activated with
a second ventral frontoparietal network (right temporoparietal
junction, right ventral frontal cortex, and insula), when unex-
pected but behaviorally relevant stimuli occurred at unattended
locations. Hence, the ventral network was labeled as “stimulus-
driven” (and was also often labeled as exogenous; for a detailed
description of endogenous and exogenous shifts of attention,
see Cormick, 1997).
Independent of whether these models are sufficient to explain
all phenomena of attention, and independent of how the pos-
tulated sub-systems specifically interact on the neuronal and
functional levels, the core aspect in all models is the bundling of
cognitive resources to adequately process stimuli being important
at a certain time. Correspondingly, attention often is metaphor-
ically described as a moveable spotlight facilitating the stimulus
inside its beam (Eriksen and Yeh, 1985; Posner and Petersen,
1990), whereby Desimone (1998) pointed out that the enhanc-
ing effect of attention on neuronal responses is perhaps better
understood in terms of a competition among all of the stimuli
in the visual field for control over behavior (biased competition
hypothesis).
The central question that has motivated much research
addresses factors influencing this attentional spotlight or the fate
of sensory items during competitive interactions. Although not
always explicitly mentioned, the visual system is the primary focus
of models and experimental studies. Of course, due to the out-
standing significance of the visual sense for human perception
and behavior, visual attention adopts a key role in the selective
choosing of input that, in turn, substantially constitutes the base
for planning and controlling our interactions with the external
world. Thereby, multiple factors contribute to the guidance of
visual attention: on the one hand, the pure visual characteris-
tics of the outside world, as well as the importance of objects for
action control, substantially determine the course of the atten-
tion focus. On the other hand, visual attention is also heavily
influenced by the internal state of the individual observer, con-
stituted by a huge diversity of factors such as his current needs,
the prevailing emotion, and motivational tendencies, as well as
more time-independent personality traits. Hence, attention is not
only stimulus-driven.
In the context of attention research, shifts of attention with
saccadic eye movements (overt attention) as well as covert atten-
tion phenomena (attentional shifts without eye movements) have
moved to the center of interest. However, as Corbetta and col-
leagues (1998, 761) pointed out, “the relationship of visuospatial
attention and eye movements is controversial.” On the one hand,
it has been known for a long time that humans can attend to
objects out of their line of sight (James, 1890); i.e., it is possi-
ble to attend to several locations in the periphery while saccades
are not allowed (e.g., Posner, 1980). On the other hand, a shift
in overt attention seems to require a shift in covert attention
(Hoffman and Subramaniam, 1995). Correspondingly, functional
anatomical data showed that overt and covert shifts of attention
not only are functionally related, but they also share parts of the
same neuronal networks in the human brain (Corbetta et al.,
1998; Beauchamp et al., 2000).
In the present review, we refer to both overt and covert visual
attention and their potential interplay with specific higher cog-
nitive functions. In this context, it must be noted that overt
attention is not exclusively driven by external stimuli, just as pro-
cesses of covert attention are not affected only by the inner state
of the observer.
In order to clarify what we mean when talking about the
impact of high-level cognitive mechanisms on overt or covert
visual attention, we will briefly describe the two current main
research fields dealing with overt attention, as they illustrate
nicely the difference between low- and high-level factors in visual
attention.
Many eye-tracking studies have addressed the impact of low-
level image properties on eye movement guidance by comparing
spatial image fixation probabilities. In this sense, the bottom-up
selection of image locations involves fast stimulus-driven mech-
anisms such as a compulsory look to unique features (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980) or at abrupt occurring stimuli (Yantis and
Jonides, 1984). Indeed, sometimes we consciously recognize the
strong impact of high salient objects, which seems to automat-
ically attract our attention even if we try to defend ourselves
against it. Hence, in literature, visual saliency is considered one
of the main determinants of gaze control by first attracting our
attention and then mediating viewing behavior (for a current
review, see Schütz et al., 2011). Empirical studies suggest the sig-
nificance of these bottom-up mechanisms on humans’ attention:
Several image features were shown to influence fixation behavior,
such as spatial contrast (Reinagel and Zador, 1999), luminance
and edges (Krieger et al., 2000), and color (Frey et al., 2007).
In addition to task dependent information and spatial viewing
biases, basic image features were found to make a significant and
independent contribution to overt visual attention (Kollmorgen
et al., 2010). Thereby, the impact of low-level image features was
found to be stable across multiple viewings of complex visual
scenes (Kaspar and König, 2011b).
Besides this impact of low-level image properties, high-level
cognitive mechanisms are suggested as the second important
influential factor on viewing behavior (Yarbus, 1967). Previous
literature showed, for example, that a congruency between a
stimulus and the content of the working memory can early and
involuntarily attract attention (Soto et al., 2005). Also, the cur-
rent behavioral mode seems to affect the allocation of attention,
since drivers and passengers in a virtual environment were found
to differ in their sensitivity to changes in the environment (Wallis
and Bülthoff, 2000). Moreover, in the context of eye-tracking
studies, sometimes the effects of the current task on viewing
behavior (e.g., browsing mode versus search mode on web pages)
are explicitly considered (Triesch et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2004;
Rothkopf et al., 2007; Betz et al., 2010; Hamborg et al., 2012), as
are effects of age on attention (Mather and Carstensen, 2003; Acik
et al., 2010). However, beyond these factors, there are further sub-
stantial mechanisms affecting attention control. They range from
the current emotional state of the observer and his motivational
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state to time-invariant personality traits. So far, few studies have
addressed these issues, although even saliency models explicitly
point out that high-level cognitive processes can significantly
affect the formation of a current saliency map. In the following,
we give a selective review of studies which focused on these high-
level mechanisms in the context of overt as well as covert attention
processes.
Although a considerable amount of research is devoted to
visual attention, a commonly used definition or model of atten-
tion is lacking. Several models have been proposed by now, each
highlighting important aspects of attention. All in all, atten-
tional processes seem to be more complex, as suggested by the
simple spotlight metaphor. The distinction between overt and
covert attention shows that shifts in attention are not neces-
sarily paralleled by shifts in eye movements. In this context,
overt attention elegantly allows the study of the impact of
high- vs. low-level factors in visual attention, as eye movements
and their potential correlation with image properties can be
controlled while high-level factors are manipulated (and vice
versa).
While the impact of low-level images on overt attention has
been extensively investigated in the last two decades, the impact
of high-level factors on attention (overt and covert) has been
neglected. The present review intends to give an overview of var-
ious, partially heterogeneous, studies on two widely neglected
high-level factors in visual attention (emotion and personality) in
order to give starting points for future research as well as point
out important methodological aspects that have be addressed
appropriately.
THE AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF EMOTION
Is there a point in time when we are completely free of any emo-
tional impact? Probably not! Of course, often we are not aware
of the specific emotion that influences our current thinking and
behavior. In contrast to other cognitive or physical processes
such as motivation, a specific intention or a present pain might
not be in the foreground of conscious perception, but might
modulate our mental state. Yet, specific emotions do correlate
with the arousal level and hence with the degree to which we
are sleepy or focused in an attentional sense. Thereby, it seems
fruitful to distinguish between the two constructs of emotion
and arousal. According to Kensinger (2004, 241), “a widely-
accepted framework proposes that affective experiences are best
characterized in a two-dimensional space.” In one dimension,
valence ranges from highly negative to highly positive, and in
a second orthogonal dimension, arousal ranges from calming
to exciting. In several previous studies, it was neither obvi-
ous nor explicitly mentioned what dimension was addressed by
the experimental manipulation, which hinders comparison or
integration with further research. With a view to the current lit-
erature, the common labeling appears to be “emotional valence”
and “emotional arousal,” respectively. However, sometimes the
term “affect” seems to be used instead of valence (e.g., Isen
et al., 1987). This distinction is important, as changes in both
arousal and valence do not necessarily lead to identical neu-
ronal activation, as found by Lane et al. (1999). They showed
that extrastriate visual cortical and anterior temporal areas were
independently activated by emotional arousal and valence. On
the other side, emotional arousal and valence were also found
to interact under certain circumstances: Adolphs et al. (1999)
investigated the recognition of emotional arousal and valence
in a subject with complete bilateral damage restricted to the
amygdala. Recognition of emotional valence was normal, but
recognition of emotional arousal was impaired for unpleasant
facial expressions, words, and sentences. Additionally, memory
can be enhanced for negative or positive stimuli which do not
evoke arousal (Kensinger and Corkin, 2003).
However, this simple orthogonal relationship between valence
and arousal indeed facilitates theory-building and experimen-
tal operationalizations, but there is also evidence for a more
intermingled relationship between both constructs. Several the-
orists postulated valence or arousal as fundamental for emo-
tional experience (e.g., Ortony et al., 1988; Lazarus, 1991); others
incorporate both aspects (e.g., Lang, 1994). Furthermore, some
authors, such as Eysenck (1981), declared that emotion results
from arousal. In contrast, others view arousal as a result of
emotion (Gray, 1981).
Moreover, Barrett (1998) showed that people differ in how
they label their own emotional states. People high in valence focus
but low in arousal focus refer to a dimensional model when label-
ing their emotional states. In contrast, people high in arousal
focus but low in valence focus prefer a discrete emotion model.
Finally, Derryberry and Rothbart (1988) pointed out that the
unitary nature of both constructs can be questioned. They deter-
mined that at almost every level of physiological analysis (cortical,
autonomic, and endocrine), arousal was revealed to be a multidi-
mensional set of processes. Similarly, the limbic system, with its
numerous circuits, allows a variety of emotional, perhaps separa-
ble, systems controlling different emotions such as fear, pleasure,
or frustration. In this context, however, neuroscience shows that
it could be an obstacle if emotional experiences were assigned
to discrete categories such as fear, anger, or happiness. On the
neuronal level, the search for co-occurring sets of neuronal fea-
tures that differentiate between such categories was not successful
(Barrett, 2006). On the other hand, Talarico et al. (2009, 382)
emphasized that “although dimensional accounts of emotion are
informative, the influence of discrete emotions should not be
underestimated.”
Consequently, as with attention, no common sense seems to
exist regarding a definition and theoretical framework of emo-
tion. However, some practical recommendations can be made:
One should not only define the type of emotional dimension
(arousal and valence) that is manipulated or investigated, but
also specify the kind of emotion or affect as clearly as possible.
The term mood is sometimes used to describe the inner state of
participants (as shown below), but it should be avoided against
this background, because it is too general and does not allow
a clear categorization of the observer’s current emotional state.
Clear labeling will facilitate the interpretation of data, and hence
the comparison with other studies will become easier and more
unambiguous. Advantages and disadvantages of a dimensional
versus categorical framework for emotional experiences have to
be assessed (see Section “Interaction Between Emotional and
Attentional Processes on the Neuronal Level”).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 321 | 3
Kaspar and König High-level factors in visual attention
THE IMPACT OF EMOTION ON ATTENTION
In studies dealing with the potential impact of emotion on other
cognitive processes, a neutral emotional state is commonly used
as a baseline and then contrasted with salient emotional states
such as an exalted joy or strong fear. These more pronounced
emotional states are in general characterized by higher valence
or arousal. For example, the impact of emotional arousal on the
sensitivity of several cognitive functions has been investigated
in multiple studies: recall of peripheral details of an event is
improved when being in a positive emotional state in contrast to
a neutral state (Talarico et al., 2009). Furthermore, positive affect,
in contrast to a negative effect, can boost performance in creative
solving tasks (Isen et al., 1987) and also enhances performance in
solving resource dilemmas (Knapp and Clark, 1991). Given these
effects on memory and higher cognitive functions, it is only a
small step to the question of to what degree the emotional state
of an observer influences visual attention and perception.
Based on this central question, Wadlinger and Isaacowitz
(2006) investigated by means of tracking eye movements how
a specific mood affects the attentional preference to emotional
stimuli. Individuals induced into positive mood, in contrast to a
neutral mood, fixatedmore on peripheral stimuli than did control
participants and displayed a broadened attention distribution.
However, this only held true for high-valence positive stimuli,
while the arousal ratings of all images were similar. Participants
under induced positive mood additionally made more frequent
saccades for slides of neutral and positive valence. Hence, they
found a significant effect of priming a positive mood.
According to Frederickson (2000), the fundamental function
of positive emotions is to broaden the momentary thought-action
repertoire of an individual, in contrast to negative emotions
that narrow this repertoire toward specific actions in order to
serve capacities for survival-related actions. However, this broader
focus of attention is not limited to positive stimuli in the environ-
ment. Several studies have shown that persons being in a positive
emotional state attend to negative information when it could be
of future advantage to them. For example, Reed and Aspinwall
(1998) provided evidence that when recalling positive experi-
ences of the past, the biased processing of self-relevant health-risk
information was reduced. This finding is not compatible with an
alternative explanation of the broader focus of attention to posi-
tive stimuli evoked by a positive mood: Wadlinger and Isaacowitz
(2006) also considered the possibility that the broader distributed
attention to positive stimuli may act to maintain the current
positive emotional state.
Here, a general distinction is important when talking about
the impact of emotion on attentional processes: on the one
hand, many studies focus on the impact of emotional stimulus
properties on the attentional focus and the perception of those
emotional stimuli. On the other hand, one can also be interested
in the impact of the observer’s current emotional state on the
course of attention, irrespective of whether the observed stimulus
itself is emotion-laden. In the first case, attention is directly driven
by the emotional features of the stimulus and hence is potentially
related to so-called bottom-up processes in the visual hierarchy.
In the second case, the emotional component playing a role in
attentional shifts is located within the observer and hence affects
attention processes on subsequent stimuli in a more top-down
manner. In the following, we will speak of an externally located
influence when referring to the impact of emotion-laden stimuli,
and we will speak of an internally located impact when referring
to the observer’s current emotional state.
The distinction between internally and externally located emo-
tional influences facilitates the evaluation of attentional processes
affected by emotion. However, this distinction is not without
problems. The internally located impact of emotion can be
undoubtedly assumed as far as the emotional state of an observer
precedes and is therefore not dependent on the stimulus. The
stimulus-driven way can be assumed for certain if the observer
was in a neutral emotional state when confronted with the stim-
ulus. Unfortunately, both cases rarely occur in this pure form.
Thereby, investigations on the impact of externally located emo-
tional properties on attention and perception can be handled:
given an adequate experimental procedure controlling for a sys-
tematic covariance between dependent and confounding vari-
ables, inter-individual differences in the current emotional state
are balanced out and hence effects between experimental condi-
tions can be derived from the experimental manipulation (i.e., the
visual input). For example, in order to investigate the impact of
positive vs. negative priming on viewing behavior under natural
conditions, potential inter-individual differences in the current
emotional state have to be equalized by randomization of sub-
jects to treatments (given a high number of subjects). Otherwise,
differences between the priming conditions regarding viewing
behavior could be derived from systematic differences between
subjects’ pre-experimental emotional states, but not from the
treatment.
In contrast, the internally located impact of emotion on per-
ception is more difficult to adequately manipulate and control.
One critical parameter is the time interval between the exper-
imental induction of a certain emotional state in the observer
and the observation process. This interval moderates the strength
of the emotional effect on attention. Emotional processes and
changes are linked to the hormone system working slower than
neural processes. Hence, the strength of an emotion induction
reaches its maximum with a temporal delay, and the level of
arousal is variable over time. Therefore, some researchers decided
to implement an emotional manipulation that works continu-
ously during the whole experimental session to maintain the
emotional state. For example, Hirschberger et al. (2010) intro-
duced permanent subliminal emotional priming in order to
maintain a context of negative valence while recording subjects’
fixation behavior on a four-image cluster.
A further difficulty for investigations on the internally located
impact of emotions on attention and perception is the fact that
the visual stimuli observed are not emotionally neutral in most
cases. Many pictures of the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS) Lang et al., 2005) depict scenes and objects comparable
to those used as target images in many studies, but valence and
arousal ratings for the IAPS images show that most pictures are
not (and should not) be perceived as neutral. Consequently, it
cannot be ruled out that an induced emotional state, i.e., the
internally located impact of emotion, interacts with the exter-
nally located impact of emotional stimuli. Finally, the observation
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of specific emotion-laden stimuli in a sequence can result in a
more andmore internally driven impact of emotion, although the
researcher is exclusively interested in the impact of image prop-
erties on perception processes. Importantly, in addition to the
division of an internally and externally located impact of emotion
on attention, researchers sometimes use stimuli showing the emo-
tion of somebody else (e.g., Vermeulen et al., 2009; see below),
which is often taken as shorthand for an emotionally positive or
negative stimulus. It might indeed induce the same emotion, yet it
is a very specific choice. These interactions and complexities show
that a clear distinction between emotional bottom-up and top-
down influences on perception is a difficult venture, and we have
to be careful when inferring from study results the exact entity of
the emotional impact on perception.
The interaction of internally and externally located emo-
tional effects is demonstrated nicely in recent eye-tracking studies
(Kaspar et al., accepted): Sets of complex scenes with high pos-
itive or negative valence as well as neutral images were used as
supraliminal emotional primes to build corresponding emotional
contexts. Nature scenes served as neutral target stimuli and were
shown embedded in the three sets of primes. Subjects did not dif-
ferentially scan the primes, but viewing behavior on neutral target
images was significantly affected by the valence of the emotional
context. Consequently, no simple transfer effects from the primes
to the targets occurred on the level of eye movements. Rather,
the results suggest that viewing behavior was indirectly influenced
by the effect of prime valence on the inner state of the observer.
Reducing the intensity of emotional priming and embedding sin-
gle positive and negative primes in a train of neutral images
belonging to different categories, negative primes were scanned
more actively than their positive counterparts. This applies to
fixations of shorter duration, longer saccades, and a more spread-
out fixation distribution. Again, the signature of eye movements
on primes was not transferred to neutral target images, but view-
ing behavior on targets was influenced by the valence of the
preceding prime. These results illustrate the complex interaction
between internally and externally located effects of emotion on
attention.
Hirschberger et al. (2010) were interested in whether even
unconscious negative priming influences the observer’s view-
ing behavior when confronted with emotionally negative target
images. In the experimental condition, a subliminally presented
negative prime (the word death) was present across the whole
duration of an eye-tracking session. In the control group, a neu-
tral prime was presented and without any specific emotional
manipulation. In their first experiment, subjects consecutively
observed several four-image patterns depicting three neutral
images and one picture showing physical injury. Participants were
asked to recognize the images at the end of each trial in order
to enhance their motivation to carefully observe the images. The
results showed that the negative prime decreased gaze duration
toward pictures of physical injury, but did not have an effect
on gaze duration toward neutral images. Hence, participants in
the negative priming condition spent less time looking at the
pictures overall in contrast to subjects in the neutral priming
condition. The authors concluded that the results are a signature
of motivated unconscious attention, since subliminally presented
negative primes evoked a strong influence on the amount of
attention that is directed at meaningful stimuli.
In addition to the impact of emotion on eye movements,
it is only natural to ask for target detection in a search task.
Accordingly, researchers also have already investigated whether
perceived emotions affect target detection. Vermeulen et al.
(2009) used the attentional blink paradigm to demonstrate that
processing fearful versus disgusted faces has different effects on
attentional processes. In the attentional blink paradigm, a pair of
targets is presented consecutively within a small time window.
Thereby, the second target is normally missed when presented
200–500ms after the offset of the first target (e.g., Raymond
et al., 1992). Vermeulen and colleagues presented either a fear-
ful or disgusted face as primes followed by a rapid sequence of
distractors consisting of random strings of symbols and digits.
Two target words of the same length were embedded into this
sequence. Subjects had to detect both words, but results showed
that processing fearful faces (which were previously assumed to
enhance the allocation of attentional resources) impaired the
detection of the second target word to a greater extent than did
the processing of disgusted faces (which were expected to dimin-
ish the allocation of attentional resources). Obviously, the kind
of emotion that is perceived plays an important role and has
to be considered when investigating emotional effects on atten-
tion and perception, because the induction of a negative emotion
leads to a reduced spread of attention not only in space, but also
in time. However, it must be pointed out that it is unclear to
what extent the short presentation of one second of emotional
faces in this study affected the emotional-state of the observer.
Moreover, it is important to note that the observation of emo-
tional faces does not have the same effect as the observation of
scenes depicting emotional content. Hariri et al. (2002) com-
pared the response of the amygdala to fearful and threatening
faces with the response to corresponding complex scenes. They
found a significantly greater amygdala response to faces in con-
trast to scenes. When we observe emotional faces, we look at
another person, but we do not have direct sensory access to what
is affecting the other person. The amygdala obviously responds
more strongly to such indirectly mediated emotions. However,
especially for studies on overt attention, not only the affective
impact of images should be considered, but also the image char-
acteristics which revealed a very strong impact on the attention
focus (see, e.g., Kaspar and König, 2011a,b). In general, many
studies use human faces to induce different emotion conditions.
Perhaps this is due to the fact that facial expressions are relatively
easy to interpret for an observer, and hence specific emotions are
recognized faster and without ambiguity. Interestingly, it seems
that the emotion expressed by a face is more important than
that face’s corresponding physical appearance. Lamy et al. (2008)
presented the first report of emotional priming of pop-outs.
In the basic pop-out task, a target differs in a specific feature
from multiple simultaneously presented distractors (Maljkovic
and Nakayama, 1994). Remarkably, when in subsequent trials
the identity of the target is repeated, detection is accelerated. In
the study of Lamy and colleagues, participants repeatedly saw
arrays of four faces and had to detect a discrepant target face
that differed in the expressed emotion. In line with the classic
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pop-out effect, the detection of the target face was faster when
the same emotional target face was presented on successive tri-
als. However, this effect only occurred for angry and for happy
faces embedded in an array of neutral faces, but neutral target
faces displayed in parallel with emotional faces were not detected
faster. Importantly, this effect completely disappeared in trials in
which all faces (target and distractors) were inverted instead of
upright. This result indicates that the faces’ emotional category,
rather than their physical properties, was the determinant for this
pop-out effect.
To conclude, the current emotional state of a person does not
only affect recall performance, performance in creative solving
tasks, or in solving resource dilemmas. Moreover, emotion also
was revealed to be a significant factor influencing humans’ visual
attention, but the distinction between an internally and an exter-
nally located impact of emotion seems necessary in this context.
Both externally located emotion-laden stimuli and the internally
located current emotional state of an observer affect overt atten-
tion. Thereby, the kind of emotional stimuli (faces vs. scenes) is
relevant, and the study design as the manipulation of emotions is
a challenging task.
PERCEPTION OF EMOTION OUTSIDE THE FOCUS
OF ATTENTION
If no eye movements are recorded, as in the study of Lamy et al.
(2008), we will not be able to assess the degree to which overt
and covert attentional processes contribute to observed effects. In
fact, several studies have shown that covert attention also plays a
crucial role in the context of emotion’s impact on attention and
perception processes.
To further disentangle the interaction of emotional stimuli and
attention, it is a necessary step to present primes outside of the
focus of attention. Phelps et al. (2006) investigated the influence
emotions have on the interaction of covert attention and per-
ception. Subjects had to perform a two-alternative forced choice
orientation discrimination task. One or four faces were presented
in the periphery, followed, after a short delay, by four Gabor
stimuli; one of these served as the target. Presentation times
of all stimuli were short to exclude eye movements and ensure
that covert attention was measured. They found that subjects
were most sensitive to stimulus contrasts when they previously
observed one face in the periphery that had a fearful expression in
contrast to a neutral expression. Presently, it cannot be excluded
that fearful faces elicited an unspecific arousal; Phelps and col-
leagues argue, however, that this effect was derived from the
specific negative valence of the primes. This implies that emotion
facilitates early visual processing. In other words, an internally
located impact of emotion can be induced without directing one’s
attention to emotion-laden stimuli.
In more natural situations with complex arrangements of
objects, the question arises whether humans extract the affective
content without fixation. Calvo and Avero (2008) used pleas-
ant and unpleasant complex images as primes that significantly
differed in valence and arousal. The primes were shortly pre-
sented in parafoveal locations, followed by a blank and then by
a foveal probe stimulus being either congruent or incongruent
in emotional valence with the preceding prime. Participants had
to promptly signal whether this probe was positive or negative
by pressing a key. The results showed that congruent prime–
probe pairs were detected faster than incongruent pairs when
the prime–probe stimulus onset asynchrony was 300ms and
the prime appeared in the left visual field. This priming effect
occurred regardless of differences between prime and probe in
physical appearance and semantic category, since the assignment
of primes and probes was random and both depicted scenes
involving either people or animals. No effect was found when the
prime was presented in the right visual field or when the prime-
probe asynchrony was 800ms. Hence, this study illustrates an
interaction of externally and internally located influences of emo-
tion, because the stimuli themselves were emotion-laden, but the
priming also induced some emotional processing in the observers
and affected their reactions to the probes. The authors concluded
that this result indicates that even complex emotional stimuli
can be assessed early by covert attention processes, and that a
dominance of the right hemisphere is involved.
Other studies scrutinized whether emotional stimuli embed-
ded in a bulk of distractors preferentially attract attention. That
is, do emotion-laden stimuli pop out in the visual field and attract
attention faster than neutral stimuli do?
In a series of experiments by Eastwood et al. (2001), partic-
ipants had to detect either a unique positive or negative target
face while observing displays of several schematic faces. All dis-
tractors were neutral faces, whereby the display positions of faces
and the number of distractors were randomly varied in each trial.
Subjects had to press a key once the target face was localized
while maintaining high accuracy. Once the key was pressed, all
faces were covered with gray squares and subjects had to indicate
the square that corresponded to the location of the target face.
Negative faces were detected faster than positive faces, and hence
the results suggest a differential guidance of focal attention. To
rule out that this effect was derived from the difference in phys-
ical image properties between positive and negative faces instead
from their valence differences, Eastwood et al. conducted a further
control experiment in which all faces were rotated by 180◦. This
change in face orientation led to a disappearance of differences
in reaction time between the positive and negative face condition.
Hence, the higher effectiveness with which faces showing negative
expressions guided focal attention actually was based on the spe-
cific valence, i.e., a holistic processing of the face configuration,
and not on local low-level image properties. This study suggests
that externally located emotional influences preferentially attract
humans’ attention, whereby the valence of the stimulus seems to
play a crucial role.
However, results are mixed in this regard. When embedded
in an array of neutral faces, subjects locate happy or surprised
faces faster and with higher accuracy than they do angry or fear-
ful faces (Calvo and Nummenmaa, 2008). Moreover, a second
experiment revealed that subjects fixated on and localized happy
faces more often first and earlier than they did any other face.
Faces were compared on several physical, i.e., basic image, prop-
erties such as luminance, contrast density, and global energy, as
well as color and texture similarity. This analysis revealed that
happy faces are more visually salient than the other emotional
faces. In a third experiment, the procedure was similar to the
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first experiment, but all faces were inverted instead of having
an upright orientation. This led to a disruption of the holistic
configuration but left local facial properties unaltered. The setup
with inverted faces replicated the pattern of differences in search
time and accuracy found before. Furthermore, the search time
and accuracy were worse for inverted faces in general, but the
inversion only had a significant influence on the detection of sad,
fearful, and angry expressions. Happy, surprised, and disgusted
faces were not significantly affected. Hence, these results are con-
sistent with a featural, rather than a configural, explanation. This
advantage for happy face detection was attributed to the percep-
tion of single features rather than to the emotional meaning of
faces. In further studies, Calvo andNummenmaa (2008) were able
to identify which facial features are responsible for this advantage.
Their results suggested that the smiling mouth is responsible for
facilitating the initial orientation to happy faces.
In contrast, a study by Fox et al. (2000) observed that peo-
ple detected a discrepant face in an array of several faces faster
when it displayed angry or sad, rather than happy, expressions.
Importantly, this effect disappeared when the faces were inverted
or when the mouth was presented in isolation. Interestingly, in
a follow-up study, Fox and Damjanovic (2006) showed that the
eye region alone can produce this threat of superiority effect
in search tasks. The degree of the superiority effect did not
increase with whole-face stimuli in contrast to eye-only stim-
uli. Therefore, the authors concluded that eye configurations are
a key signal of threat, whereas Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008)
found the smiling mouth to be responsible for the superiority
effect of happy faces. Obviously, much more research is necessary
to uncover the principles of the superiority effects of emotional
facial expressions.
Given that emotional faces attract attention more than neu-
tral faces do, researchers have begun to locate brain regions linked
to this perceptual phenomenon. Vuilleumier (2002) pointed out
that visual responses in the fusiform cortex were enhanced for
emotional faces, consistent with their greater perceptual saliency.
He also referred to data from event-related evoked potentials and
neurophysiology that suggested rapid parallel processing of emo-
tional information of sensory inputs. Moreover, processing of
emotional information led to a more detailed perceptual analysis
of the sensory inputs and hence biased competition for attention
toward the representation of emotionally salient stimuli.
However, it is controversial to what extent emotion-laden
stimuli are processed without attention. In general, the model
of attention proposed by Desimone and Duncan (1995) sug-
gests a competition of stimuli for neural resources. Spatially
directed attention can bias this competition amongmultiple stim-
uli and enhance the impact of the attended stimulus. For example,
Reynolds et al. (1999) have investigated the impact of focused
attention on neurons in macaque areas V2 and V4 (see also
Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). Presenting an additional stimulus in
the receptive field reduced the neuronal response to the primary
stimulus. However, when the monkey’s attention was directed to
one stimulus, the suppressive impact of the second stimulus was
reduced. The reduction of the suppressive influence of such dis-
tractors has also been shown in humans by fMRI studies (Kastner
et al., 1998). Hence, it appears that processing outside the overt
focus of attention is weakened or even eliminated under certain
conditions (Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004).
In contrast to these findings, several studies suggest that the
role of attention is different with respect to the processing of
emotion-laden stimuli. For example, Whalen et al. (1998) inves-
tigated whether the amygdala is activated when human subjects
observe masked emotional stimuli. They subliminally presented
fearful or happy faces, followed immediately by a neutral face
serving as a backward mask. Although subjects reported con-
scious perception of neutral faces only, the BOLD fMRI signal in
the amygdala was higher during the observation of masked fearful
faces in contrast to masked happy faces. Pessoa and Ungerleider
(2004) interpret these data as showing that the amygdala is spe-
cialized for the fast detection of emotionally relevant stimuli in
the environment, whereby this detection process can occur even
without attention. In contrast to this view, they found that such
a differential response of the amygdala to emotional faces signif-
icantly depends on the extent to which attentional resources are
available for face processing: Participants were confronted with a
foveally presented fearful, happy, or neutral face and additional
bars located in the left and right periphery (Pessoa et al., 2002).
Subjects always fixated on the face during the short presentation.
In one condition, they had to direct their attention to the face
in order to indicate whether the face was male or female. In a
second condition, attention was directed to the bars in order to
indicate whether they were of the same orientation. This demand-
ing bar orientation task was intended to attract all attentional
resources. The results showed that attended faces in contrast
to unattended faces elicited greater activations bilaterally in the
amygdala for all facial expressions. The authors concluded that
contrary to the prevailing view, emotional faces are not immune
to the effect of attention. In summary, evidence for an attention-
free processing of emotional items is mixed, and future research
is mandatory.
THE REVERSEDWAY: ATTENTION CAN AFFECT EMOTIONAL
RESPONSES
Given the extensive evidence suggesting that externally located
emotional stimuli as well as internally located affective states
determine how visual attention is allocated, the question arises
whether this causal effect is also working in the reverse direc-
tion. In the following, we discuss an interesting way in which
attention can influence emotional perception. In the study by
Raymond et al. (2003), participants initially saw two schematic
faces showing the same affective expression (positive, negative,
or neutral). The faces were placed on the left and on the right
of a fixation cross. Both faces were replaced by two complex but
meaningless visual patterns differing in structure. At the begin-
ning of each experimental block, one of these two visual patterns
was designated as the target and participants were told to locate
the target pattern as fast as possible by pressing a corresponding
key after stimulus onset. After participants had responded, one
of the two visual patterns previously presented occurred in isola-
tion. Now, subjects had to judge whether this meaningless visual
pattern appeared to be cheery or dreary. The results showed that
the previously attended visual target pattern was judged more
positively than the ignored distractor, which in turn was judged
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more negatively than a novel visual pattern. Hence, not the act
of attending, but the active ignoring of the distractor led to its
affective devaluation. Obviously, attentional inhibition of task-
irrelevant stimuli (distractors) leads to a devaluation when the
previously ignored stimulus is encountered again (Fenske and
Raymond, 2006).
In further studies, Raymond et al. (2005) investigated evalu-
ations of Mondrian-like patterns. Participants had to search for
a target among a varying number of distractors that appeared
simultaneously. Immediately afterwards, participants rated the
affective tone of either a prior target or a prior distractor. Relative
to the ratings of the prior targets, the magnitude of the distrac-
tor devaluation was greater when the distractors were presented
at their original screen locations during evaluation, in contrast
to the case when the distractors appeared at different locations.
Moreover, distractor devaluation was generally enhanced when
the distractor was located near the target, and it was attenuated
when the target was further away.
As shown by Mounts (2000), the potential of distractors to
interfere with the current performance is greater when a dis-
tractor is near the task-relevant target location. Consequently, to
prevent reduced performance, the inhibition of distractors pre-
sumably increases with higher proximity to the target. In this
context, Fenske and Raymond (2006) interpret the finding that
the proximity of a distractor to a target strengthens the devalua-
tion of the distractor in terms of a positive correlation between the
amount of inhibition and the amount of distractor devaluation.
From our point of view, the attention’s influence on emotion
formation suggested by these findings should motivate further
research in this direction. If bottom-driven attention truly con-
stituted emotional ratings or even the emotional state of the
observer, it would and should be a high priority to consider
this causal effect when investigating subjective data as well as
psychophysiological data.
INTERACTION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL AND ATTENTIONAL
PROCESSES ON THE NEURONAL LEVEL
Emotional as well as attentional processes have been attributed
to dynamic processes in large-scale networks. With respect to the
neuronal level, the central question is, where do these two pro-
cesses interact? Numerous authors have addressed these processes
individually (see Bisley, 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012 for reviews
on the neuronal basis of attention and emotion respectively). The
interplay between them has been neglected for a long time, as
pointed out by several authors (e.g., Carretié et al., 2001; Taylor
and Fragopanagos, 2005), but now has moved into the focus of
current research.
One functional pathway can be outlined against the back-
ground of the original model of attention postulated by Posner
and Petersen (1990). The posterior attentional system involved
in orienting processes receives strong innervation by pathways
of the norepinephrine system arising in the locus ceruleus. The
norepinephrine innervation is primarily present in the posterior
parietal cortex, the superior colliculus, and the thamalic pulvinar.
Hence, it seems to play a crucial role inmaintaining alertness. The
amygdala, in contrast, is a key structure of the emotional system
and has a key role in regulating arousal (Williams et al., 2005).
Furthermore, it is functionally related to both above-mentioned
dimensions of emotion, namely valence and arousal. For an inter-
action between valence and arousal in the amygdala, see Garavan
et al. (2001). Sterpenich and colleagues (2006) found the locus
ceruleus to respond during correct recognition of neutral events
encoded in an emotional context, whereby this response linearly
depends on the autonomic arousal. Furthermore, the LC and
the amygdala are functionally more connected during correct
face recognition in emotional contexts than in neutral contexts.
Obviously, the amygdalamodulates emotionalmemories not only
by affecting hippocampal activity, but also indirectly by influ-
encing the central arousal. Perhaps the interplay of the locus
ceruleus and the amygdala is a key link for the attention-emotion
interaction.
With respect to the ventral frontoparietal network in the
model of Corbetta and Shulman (2012), a link to emotion
was also recently found: the ventral orienting network includes
the inferior frontal cortices, which probably process emotional
communicative information based on visual or auditory input
(Nakamura et al., 1999). In line with this, Lim et al. (2009)
combined the attentional blink paradigm with aversive condi-
tioning and found evidence that the impact of the amygdala
on visual cortical responses was partially mediated by the fron-
toparietal attention network. This result suggests that the fate of
a visual stimulus during competitive interactions is determined
by its affective significance, affectively significant stimuli being
favored.
A further hint for emotion–attention network interactions
resulted from a visual oddball task combined with fMRI mea-
surement (Fichtenholtz et al., 2004): Participants had to detect
rare target stimuli embedded sequentially in a stream of standard
stimuli. Fichtenholtz et al. chose squares as the standard stimu-
lus, occurring in 84.4% of trials. Circles, neutral complex scenes,
or aversive complex scenes occurred at low rates. One group of
subjects counted circle images; a second group counted aversive
stimuli. The experiment revealed a higher activation in the amyg-
dala and ventral frontotemporal cortices for emotional rather
than for neutral scenes. Furthermore, a main effect of the atten-
tion focus in dorsal frontoparietal cortices was observed in terms
of a greater activity for task-relevant target images irrespective of
emotional content. Importantly, an interaction between the emo-
tional and attentional focus was exclusively located in the anterior
cingulated gyrus. When circles were task-relevant, the response of
the anterior cingulated gyrus was equal to the response to circle
targets and emotional scenes serving as distractors in this group.
However, the activity of anterior cingulated gyrus increased when
the emotional scenes were task-relevant, but decreased for dis-
tracting circles. These results highlight the integrative role of the
anterior cingulated gyrus in the context of emotion–attention
interactions.
Finally, Lane et al. (1999) used the PET technique to measure
brain activity while male participants observed emotion-laden
IAPS images controlled for valence and arousal. Participants
simultaneously performed a distractor task in which they had
to respond to auditory tones during image observation. A lowly
and a highly distracting task were employed to manipulate the
extent to which attention was absorbed by the secondary task. The
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results showed that the activation of the extrastriate visual cortices
and the anterior temporal areas was independent of the emotional
valence and arousal of stimuli and independent of the attentional
resources. In contrast, there was an overlap in activation patterns
associated with emotional arousal, emotional valence, and atten-
tion in extrastriate visual cortex centered in the right Brodmann
areas 18 and 38 (the right anterior temporal cortex). These results
suggest a common modulation of visual processing by emo-
tion and attention at very early as well as late stages of cortical
analysis.
Some authors devoted to this interaction provide first liter-
ature reviews (e.g., Compton, 2003; Schupp et al., 2006) and
develop a model of emotion–attention interaction (Taylor and
Fragopanagos, 2005). Besides these important works, future
research and theory formation would benefit from considering
several factors that potentially affect results:
1. First, it seems useful to envision the analogy between the gen-
eral effects of attention and emotion on the behavioral level
(c.f. Lane et al., 1999). As outlined above, in terms of the spot-
light metaphor, attention enhances the processing of specific
target stimuli by reducing the cognitive resources allocated to
alternative stimuli. A similar effect can be observed regarding
emotion: as Kensinger (2004) pointed out, emotional stim-
uli are more likely to be processed when attentional resources
are limited, suggesting a prioritized processing of emotional
information. This conclusion is supported, for example, by the
findings of Anderson and Phelps (2001). They used the atten-
tional blink design and found the second target was missed
fewer times when it was a word of aversive content in contrast
to a neutral word. Moreover, in comparison to neutral scenes,
images depicting unpleasant or pleasant content are associated
with increased early posterior negativity, late positive poten-
tial, and sustained positive slow wave (Schupp et al., 2006).
The observation of emotion-laden stimuli also enhances the
activity in visual brain regions that are associated with object
recognition, such as inferotemporal cortices and the fusiform
(Sabatinelli et al., 2004). Interestingly, patients with dam-
age in the amygdala do not show a modulation of atten-
tion by emotional arousal (Kensinger, 2004). Correspondingly,
Compton (2003) emphasizes a two-stage process in the context
of emotion–attention interaction: in the first stage, a subcor-
tical circuit involving the amygdala evaluates pre-attentively
the emotional significance of a stimulus. In the second stage,
stimuli tagged as emotionally significant are prioritized in the
competition for access to selective attention.
To conclude, for research on effects of selective attention
and biased competition, it appears fruitful to explicitly con-
sider the modulating effect of arousal. Effects found in non-
arousing situations change when emotions come into play.
Correspondingly, Mather and Sutherland (2011) provide evi-
dence that emotional arousal amplifies salience based on
perceptual contrast (bottom-up) as well as the top-down com-
petitive advantage of high- vs. low-priority stimuli. Arousal
stimulates the amygdala which, in turn, modulates sensory
processing, frontoparietal attentional networks, and memory
consolidation. Accordingly, the authors labeled the impact
of emotion as “arousal-biased competition” in perception.
Consequently, the usage of emotion-laden stimuli, for exam-
ple, will change the neuronal areas of significant activity
compared to emotionally neutral conditions.
2. As outlined above, the distinction between arousal and valence
is useful in the context of emotions. Hence the question
arises whether emotional valence also affects biased competi-
tion. In short, previous studies found arousal more important
than valence in biased competition, but positive and nega-
tive valence have opposite effects on selective attention, and
they additionally interact with the arousal level (for details,
seeMather and Sutherland, 2011). Moreover, different types of
valence are associated with different brain regions (Kensinger
and Schacter, 2008).
3. The idea that emotional experiences can be assigned to dis-
crete categories such as fear, anger, or happiness could be an
obstacle. On the neuronal level, the search for unique signa-
tures of discrete emotions did not produce tangible results.
Specifically, co-occurring sets of neuronal features differenti-
ating between such categories were not found (Barrett, 2006).
Perhaps it is more expedient to assume more basic psycholog-
ical processes not being directly associated with emotion, but
combined in various ways to produce different emotional and
affective states (see Kober et al., 2008).
4. The kind of attentional process that is addressed by the experi-
mental design significantly influences the potential brain areas
that came into question tomediate emotion–attention interac-
tions. Consequently, the kind of attentional process should be
specified as precisely as possible because of the heterogeneity
of labels and understandings as outlined above.With respect to
overt and covert attention, for example, Bisley (2011) provided
a recent review focusing on associated brain networks.
5. Future research would benefit from the distinction between
an internally located vs. externally located emotional impacts
on attention. It is important to differentiate between emo-
tional states within subjects and external stimulation with
emotion-laden stimuli as demonstrated nicely in a study by
Lee and colleagues (2010): participants observed ambiguous
visual stimuli that consisted of emotional faces embedded in
different levels of visual white noise. Interestingly, when par-
ticipants thought to look at an emotional face while they
actually observed a neutral face, the type of enhanced activ-
ity in posterior visual regions was identical with the activity
found during the perception of emotional faces.
THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY TRAITS ON ATTENTION
Investigations of attentional processes commonly focus on uni-
versal mechanisms. Despite ever-present inter-individual vari-
ance, the view prevails that attentional processes are comparable
between individuals. Given this point of view, sampling from
a fictive population of human subjects is an easy step, since
it should not significantly matter which subjects constitute the
resulting sample. In the end, all values in the dependent variables
are averaged across subjects, and an effect of the treatment is even-
tually observable. However, inter-subject variance may be large,
and sometimes subgroups can be identified that differ notice-
ably from each other but are homogenous within. For example,
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Pessoa et al. (2005) used a design which leaned on the above-
mentioned study by Whalen et al. (1998) who showed that the
amygdala responded differentially to masked fearful and happy
faces. In contrast, Phillips et al. (2004) did not find any differential
response to masked faces in the amygdala, though they also pre-
sented emotional target faces for only 30ms before masking it by
a neutral face. Pessoa et al. (2005) showed that no universal objec-
tive awareness threshold exists for fear perception. They varied the
duration for which a target face was presented before immediately
masking it by a neutral face. A substantial percentage of their par-
ticipants (64%) were able to reliably detect target faces presented
for only 33ms, and some participants even detected fearful faces
that were presented for only 17ms. Obviously, individuals signif-
icantly differ in their sensitivity to emotion-laden stimuli, which
is perhaps based on individual differences in the general threat
sensitivity (Etkin et al., 2004).
The field of differential psychology explicitly addresses such
inter-individual differences. However, even here only few stud-
ies make an effort to define a real target population with a
representative sample. Instead, including many of our own eye-
tracking studies, participants are mostly recruited from local
educational programs with multiple resulting biases in the sample
composition.
Importantly, we do not refer to inter-individual differences
induced by context-dependent fluctuations of the physical, men-
tal, or emotional constitution of individuals or plain measure-
ment noise. Rather, we here discuss time- and context-invariant
personality traits. Indeed, a whole battery of tests is available to
address personality traits in psychological diagnostics. The d2
test, for example, (Brickenkamp, 2002) assesses individual dif-
ferences in attention ability and identifies attentional deficits.
However, the two fields of differential psychology and physiolog-
ical/psychophysical studies of attention and emotion are largely
separated. Only a few studies of visual attention control for inter-
individual differences in general attention ability in order to
eliminate potential confounding variables (e.g., Hamborg et al.,
2012). In the following, we want to illustrate how manifold the
impact of time-invariant personality traits on attention can be.
Eizenman et al. (2003) presented slides containing four images.
Each of the four images fell into another thematic category:
neutral, loss and sadness, threat and anxiety, interpersonal attach-
ment, and social contact. Clinical subjects with depressive disor-
der and a nonclinical control group observed these slides for an
extended period of time. Simultaneous recording of eye move-
ments revealed that the clinical subjects spent more time looking
at images depicting loss or sadness than the control group did.
Furthermore, mean fixation duration on these images was larger
for subjects with depression disorder. Moreover, fixation times
of both sample groups correlated with the valence ratings. The
authors concluded that individuals with depressive disorder selec-
tively attend to mood-congruent visual material. Consequently,
an elaborative processing of mood-incongruent stimuli is pre-
vented when they are simultaneously presented with dysphoric
images.
Attention research has also focused on the eye movement per-
formance of patients with schizophrenia. They were found to have
abnormal smooth-pursuit eye movements; that is, they were not
able to adequately follow a moving object with their eyes. This
dysfunction in schizophrenia patients was frequently replicated in
samples from all over the world, and it was even shown for first-
degree biological relatives of schizophrenia patients (Levy et al.,
1993).
Several studies focus on the influence of nonclinical person-
ality traits on humans’ visual attention. Friesen and Kingstone
(1998) showed that normal subjects asked to detect, localize, or
identify a target letter on the left or right of a centrally pre-
sented face were faster when the gaze of the face was toward,
versus away from, the target. This was the case even though faces’
gaze direction had no predictive value with respect to the tar-
get location and subjects were told so. Based on this finding,
Mathews et al. (2003) investigated whether faces showing fearful
expressions enhance the effect of another’s gaze in directing the
attention of an observer andwhether this effect correlates with the
trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger
et al., 1993). For that purpose, Mathews and colleagues presented
photographs of four men and four women showing either a neu-
tral facial expression or a fearful one. In the original, the eyes of
all eight persons looked straight ahead. In two further versions
of the photographs, the pupils were moved either to the far left or
right corner of both eyes. Each experimental trial started with the
original version of a photograph presented in the middle of the
screen. It either remained there or was subsequently replaced by
the same photograph with eyes shifted left or right. After a varying
time interval, one target letter appeared on the left or on the right
side of the face, whereby the gaze direction was congruent, neu-
tral, or incongruent to the location of the target letter. Participants
had to respond as fast as possible by pressing the corresponding
key. Response latencies and errors served as dependent variables
and were analyzed by additionally considering inter-individual
differences in trait anxiety. Results showed that attention is more
likely to be guided by the direction of fearful rather than neu-
tral gaze, but only in anxiety-prone individuals. Overall, faster
responses were found in congruent than in incongruent trials, and
this congruency effect was similar in both groups with respect
to neutral faces. However, when fearful faces were shown, the
congruency effect was significantly larger in the group of highly
anxious persons in contrast to lowly anxious ones.
It can be concluded that the attention focus of highly anxious
individuals is more affected by faces showing fearful facial expres-
sions indicating some danger in the environment, whereas lowly
anxious persons do not orientate their attention toward the gaze
direction of fearful others. Interestingly, in contrast to the highly
anxious group, the lowly anxious group made faster responses
to neutral faces in congruent as well as incongruent trials. This
result pattern suggests a simple argument: internally located fear
hampers fast reaction.
This slowing of disengaging one’s attention from a visual cue
(i.e., the gaze direction of the faces) shows the complexity of the
process. Indeed, a study on the physiology of such disengagement
of attention by Khayat et al. (2006) showed that monkeys’ atten-
tion can be rapidly allocated to newly appearing objects before
their attention disengages from a previously attended object.
In a meta-analysis, Bar-Haim et al. (2007) analyzed a total
of 172 studies including 2263 anxious and 1768 non-anxious
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subjects to reveal the boundary conditions of the threat-related
attentional bias, that is, a higher sensitivity to threat-related stim-
uli than to neutral stimuli in highly anxious (but not in lowly
anxious) persons. They found across all studies that a significant
threat-related bias was present in highly anxious subjects but not
in lowly anxious subjects. Moreover, this bias did not depend on
the experimental paradigm and was found under varying exper-
imental conditions. Furthermore, the size of the threat-related
bias is comparable between anxious children and anxious adults.
The mean effect size is d = 0.45, indicating a midsize effect
(Cohen, 1988).
Perlman et al. (2009) conducted an eye tracking experiment
to investigate visual scanpath characteristics evoked by emotional
facial expressions. In this context, they especially focused on
individual differences in personality. Participants had to freely
observe prototypic emotional facial expressions, including happy,
angry, fearful, sad, surprised, disgusted, and neutral expressions.
No further task was implemented. Before the eye tracking session,
subjects had to fill out the Neo Five-Factor Inventory to assess
the “big” dimensions of personality, namely extraversion, neu-
roticism, agreeableness, openness, and conscientiousness. Results
revealed that the amount of time spent looking at the eyes of
fearful faces was positively related to neuroticism. Hence, and in
accordance with the above-described findings of Eizenman et al.
(2003), a trait congruency model is supported; that is, individ-
uals seem to search for information that is congruent to their
personality traits and avoid incongruent material.
Moreover, Rauthmann and colleagues (2012) also measured
the big five personality traits as well as participants’ motiva-
tion in terms of behavioral inhibition and activation. Participants
observed abstract images while their eye movements were
recorded. The authors demonstrated with linear mixed models
that neuroticism, extraversion, openness, and the behavioral acti-
vation system predicted the signature of eye movement param-
eters, namely the number of fixations, the mean duration of
fixations, and the dwelling time within specific areas of interest.
However, at this point we should emphasize that the obvi-
ous impact of certain personality traits on attention processes is
often more complex and not as obvious as it seems against the
background of the above described studies. We know from dif-
ferential psychology that a certain behavior is always the result
of the interplay between personal dispositions such as needs
or personality traits and current situational conditions; these
can interact in complex ways (Heckhausen and Heckhausen,
2006). Hence, it is probably insufficient to consider only poten-
tial main effects of personality traits on attention processes.
Rather, it could be fruitful to elucidate the specific interac-
tions between current situational factors and time-invariant per-
sonality traits to reveal further interesting effects. In a recent
study Kaspar and König (2011a), we investigated changes in eye
movement parameters during complex scenes repeatedly pre-
sented in a long sequence of stimuli. In this context, we also
considered the subjects’ global interest in the stimulus set, as
well as their general ability to stay within interesting activities
without shifting prematurely to alternative activities labeled as
the personality trait “action orientation regarding the perfor-
mance of activities” (AOP; Kuhl, 1994). We expected that this
ability only affects viewing behavior when the stimulus material
becomes successively more familiar to the observer and that it
is related to its interestingness. In fact, we found that the atten-
tion focus became more and more locally expressed by several
saccade parameters, fixation distributions on the level of sin-
gle subjects, and an increasing inter-subject variance of fixation
distributions across repeated image observations. Importantly,
this general tendency was weaker for the group of subjects
who rated the image set as interesting, compared to those sub-
jects who were not interested in the images. Moreover, the
effects were partly mediated by subjects’ ability to stay within
interesting activities without shifting prematurely to alternative
activities.
Besides the role of personality traits in terms of motivational
or behavioral tendencies, demographic variables were also found
to be influential factors on attention: Feng et al. (2007) provided
evidence for gender differences in spatial selective attention. In
their study, they used the useful-field-of-view task to measure
spatial cognition. This paradigm allows measuring the ability to
detect, localize, and identify a target stimuli as well as the spa-
tial distribution of attentional resources over the field of view.
As far as subjects having very little video game experience, men
performed better than women. The difference diminished when
video game experience was high. Interestingly, in a second study,
they were able to show that 10 h of training with an action video
game improved performance measurements for spatial attention,
whereby women benefited more than men. This implies that
balancing men and women in between-subject study designs or
considering the gender ratio when interpreting results in within-
subject designs is important. Moreover, potential inter-individual
differences in domain-specific expertise should also be consid-
ered if these potentially influence the dependent variables. In
this context, Tanaka and Curran (2001) showed that very specific
expertise can change EEG signatures. In their study, dog experts
as well as bird experts had to categorize objects. In contrast to
categorization of objects outside their domain of expertise, cate-
gorization of objects within their respective domains of expertise
induced an enhanced early negative component. Consequently,
it is mandatory to collect useful metadata, such as demographic
variables or domain specific expertise, to appropriately control
for these confounding variables. This can be done by adapt-
ing the study designs or explicitly introducing inter-individual
differences as independent variables in the study design. Also,
as suggested by Polyhart and Vandenberg (2010) for the field
of longitudinal research, it seems necessary to break out of the
“take-what-we-can-get” mentality regarding sample selection in
cognitive science.
In line with this suggestion, we discuss that subjects’ age also
can produce substantial artifacts in the results if it is not consid-
ered in sample selection or when assigning subjects to different
groups in between-subjects designs.
Mather and Carstensen (2003) examined age differences in
attention to and memory for faces. In their experiment, two faces
were placed on the left and on the right side of a screen. One of
these faces had an emotional expression (sadness, anger, or happi-
ness); the other face was neutral. After both faces disappeared, one
dot was shown either on the left or the right position where the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 321 | 11
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faces were previously presented. The dot remained on the display
until the participants pressed a corresponding key. Results showed
that older adults responded faster to this dot when it was pre-
sented on the same side as a neutral face than when it was located
on the same side as a negative face. This attentional bias was not
found for younger adults. Moreover, older adults remembered
positive faces better than faces with negative facial expressions.
Mather and Carstensen concluded that older adults obviously
avoided negative information and that this attentional bias was
consistent with older adults’ generally better emotional well-being
and their tendency to remember negative less accurately than
positive information.
Acik et al. (2010) compared the viewing behavior of three
age groups (7- to 9-year-old children, 19- to 27-year-old young
adults, and older adults above 72 years) on natural and com-
plex scenes before performing a delayed patch recognition task.
Their results suggested that bottom-up mechanisms play a more
important role in younger ages: eye movements of young chil-
dren were heavily guided by basic image features, whereas
older adults’ viewing behavior was less feature-related. In addi-
tion to this differential effect of age on feature-fixation cor-
relations, the explorativeness—that is, the spread of fixation
distributions—correlated with feature-related viewing negatively
in younger ages. In contrast, older adults increased their feature-
related viewing behavior by being more explorative, leading to
a better performance in the subsequent patch recognition task.
Consequently, it seems that basic image features lose their impact
on attention guidance as age increases, and this is paralleled by a
stronger impact of top-down processes.
To conclude, we suggest that future studies on humans’ atten-
tion would benefit from experimental designs that are appro-
priate for revealing personality influences on viewing behavior.
For that purpose, study designs have to be ecologically valid,
since very artificial experimental paradigms can cap the impact
of personality differences. In this context, a pre-experimental
definition of the target population and a subsequent sam-
pling of an appropriate (i.e., representative) sample should be
considered.
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